Property Mediation – How has the process changed since the FLA was amended?

Case reference guide · Last reviewed September 2026

The Family Law Amendment Act 2024 (Cth) commenced on 10 June 2025. It codified the property decision-making framework, made family violence an express consideration in the property pathway, wrote the duty of disclosure into the Act, and changed how debts, wastage and ‘add-backs’ are dealt with. The cases below show how courts are applying the new framework — and what that means for the way we prepare parties and run property mediations.

The amendments at a glance

Codified framework — s 79 (and the s 90SM equivalents for de facto couples) now set out the pathway:

s 79(1)2024 AMENDMENT (summary) — in property settlement proceedings the court may, subject to s 79(6) for a companion animal, make such order as it considers appropriate altering the parties’ interests in property, including a settlement of property or an order requiring a transfer of property.

s 79(2) — “The court must not make an order under this section unless it is satisfied that, in all the circumstances, it is just and equitable to make the order.” The same requirement is repeated at s 79AA(1).

s 79(3)(a)2024 AMENDMENT — identify the existing legal and equitable rights and interests in the property of the parties, and their existing liabilities;

s 79(3)(b)2024 AMENDMENT — take into account the contributions considerations and the current and future circumstances (below), except for the purpose of making an order about the ownership of a companion animal.

s 79(4) contributions — (a) direct and indirect financial contributions, (b) direct and indirect non-financial contributions, (c) contributions to welfare including as a homemaker or parent, (ca) the effects of family violence on ability to contribute, (d) the effect of any proposed order on the earning capacity of either party, (f) any other FLA order affecting a party or child of the marriage, (g) any child support under the CSA paid for a child of the marriage. There is no paragraph (e) — the old hook into the s 75(2) factors is repealed.

s 79(5)2024 AMENDMENT current and future circumstances (if relevant) — (a) the effects of family violence, (b) the age and state of health of each party, (c) income, property and financial resources and the physical and mental capacity for appropriate gainful employment, (d) the effect of any material wastage, caused intentionally or recklessly, (e) any liabilities incurred, (f) the extent of care of a child including the need to provide appropriate housing, (g) commitments to support themselves and anyone else, (h) responsibilities to support any other person, (i) eligibility for a pension, allowance or benefit, (j) the rate of any such pension, allowance or benefit, (k) a reasonable standard of living after separation or divorce, (l) whether altering property interests would let a party undertake education, establish a business or otherwise obtain an adequate income, (m) the effect of any order on a creditor’s ability to recover a debt, (n) each party’s contribution to the other’s income, earning capacity, property and financial resources, (o) the duration of the marriage and its effect on earning capacity, (p) the need to protect a party wishing to continue as a parent, (q) the financial circumstances of any cohabitation with another person, (r) the terms of any Part VIIIAB order or declaration, (s) child support a party is to provide, or may be liable to provide in future, (t) the terms of any binding financial agreement, (u) the terms of any binding Part VIIIAB financial agreement, (v) any other fact or circumstance the justice of the case requires.

s 79(6)2024 AMENDMENT companion animals — in property settlement proceedings, so far as they concern property that is a companion animal, the court may make an order (including a consent or interim order): (a) that only one party to the marriage, or only one person joined as a party, is to have ownership of the companion animal; (ab) that the companion animal be transferred to another person who has consented to the transfer; or (b) that the companion animal be sold. The court may not make any other kind of order under this section with respect to the ownership of the companion animal. (For ‘companion animal’, see s 4(1).)

s 79(7)2024 AMENDMENT companion animal considerations — in considering what order (if any) should be made with respect to the ownership of a companion animal, the court is to take into account the following, so far as relevant: (a) the circumstances in which the companion animal was acquired; (b) who has ownership or possession of the companion animal; (c) the extent to which each party cared for, and paid for the maintenance of, the companion animal; (d) any family violence to which one party has subjected or exposed the other party; (e) any history of actual or threatened cruelty or abuse by a party towards the companion animal; (f) any attachment by a party, or a child of the marriage, to the companion animal; (g) the demonstrated ability of each party to care for and maintain the companion animal in the future, without support or involvement from the other party; (h) any other fact or circumstance which, in the opinion of the court, the justice of the case requires to be taken into account.

Family violence as an economic factor — s 79(4)(ca) requires the court to consider the effect of family violence on a party’s ability to make contributions (codifying Kennon); s 79(5)(a) requires consideration of its effect on current and future circumstances. Section 4AB(2A) gives examples of economic and financial abuse.

Disclosure — ss 71B and 90RI codify the duty of full and frank disclosure. It applies to separated parties who are preparing for a proceeding about financial or property matters — which squarely covers the FDR and mediation stage — and continues until the matter is finalised. Practitioners have their own duty here: s 71B(10) and s 90RI(10) require a legal practitioner or FDR practitioner working with a separated party to explain the duties of disclosure and when they apply, explain the potential consequences of not complying, and encourage the party to comply.

Debts and wastage — liabilities are addressed at the s 79(3) identification stage; wastage is an express consideration under s 79(5)(d). Notional ‘add-backs’ are no longer available (see Shinohara).

Costs — s 117 (the former costs section) was repealed by the Family Law Amendment Act 2024. The costs provisions now sit in Part XIVC — Costs (ss 114UA–114UE). The default remains that each party bears their own costs (s 114UB(1)), and the court may make any costs order it considers just where circumstances justify it (s 114UB(2)).

Intake & screening checklist — economic & financial abuse

Expanded definition — economic and financial abuse has been added to the s 4AB(2A) definition of family violence. Screen for it in every property matter, not only where parenting issues raise family violence.

Two decision points — consider the impact of DFV both on contributions (s 79(4)(ca)) and on current and future needs (s 79(5)(a)), and link the evidence to each.

Family violence as an economic factor

This is where the case law is still developing. The provisions codify the Kennon line of authority, and early decisions show a family-violence argument must be supported by evidence of its economic impact — not just that violence occurred.

Kennon & Kennon [1997] FamCA 27; (1997) FLC 92-757

The Full Court held that where family violence made a party’s contributions ‘significantly more arduous’, that could be taken into account. Sections 79(4)(ca) and 79(5)(a) codify and arguably broaden this — and family violence expressly includes economic and financial abuse.

For mediators: Kennon claims were historically rare and hard to run. Under the codified provisions they are expected to become more common in property matters — including matters that settle at mediation.

FULL JUDGMENT — AUSTLII

Pantoja & Pantoja [2025] FedCFamC1A 104 (18 June 2025)

A family-violence adjustment must be properly reasoned — it is not automatic.

The trial judge divided property 59:41 in the wife’s favour on the basis the husband’s family violence significantly impacted the burden of her contributions. The Full Court allowed the husband’s appeal — not because family violence was irrelevant, but because the reasoning was inadequately explained. The impact may be considered in contributions and in future needs, but if the future-needs route is taken the judge must explain the ‘predictive prospective factors’, e.g. the ongoing impact on earning capacity.

For mediators: a finding of family violence does not translate automatically into a percentage. In mediation, help parties think through how the violence actually affected earning capacity, contributions and financial position — not just whether it happened.

FULL JUDGMENT — AUSTLII

Acone & Paget (No 2) [2025] FedCFamC1F 649

Family violence weighed holistically — no separate ‘percentage’.

A positive finding that family violence made the wife’s contributions more difficult was considered holistically with the other contributions — there was no separate, itemised ‘family violence percentage’.

For mediators: courts are treating family violence as one strand in a holistic assessment, not a standalone head of adjustment. Manage expectations of a dramatic separate uplift carefully.

FULL JUDGMENT — AUSTLII

Pryor & Pryor (No 2) [2026] FedCFamC1F 77 (12 February 2026)

Financial control recognised as family violence affecting contributions.

The judge found family violence in the form of financial and other control hampered the wife’s ability to contribute. With other factors, her contributions were assessed at 57.5% — although no specific percentage was attributed to the family violence alone. A clear example of economic abuse forming part of the property analysis under the new framework.

For mediators: financial control — restricting access to money, assets or employment — is family violence for these purposes. This has direct implications for intake and screening in property matters, not just parenting matters.

FULL JUDGMENT — AUSTLII

Bartos & Smagulova [2026] FedCFamC1A 70 (24 April 2026)

When must a court make findings about family violence? (A parenting case — the principle carries across.)

Reviewing the authorities, the Full Court held that where allegations are central — particularly serious incidents going to safety — the court should endeavour to make findings; where they are not central, it need not be ‘distracted by the quest’.

For mediators: family-violence material needs to be linked to the decision being made. It also helps explain to parties why a court may never adjudicate their allegations — one more reason a self-determined outcome can serve them better.

FULL JUDGMENT — AUSTLII

Evidence matters. Where family violence is relied on in a property matter, the evidence should be specific and directed to financial impact — controlling conduct, restricted access to funds or information, debts accumulated in one party’s name, and effects on capacity to work or recover after separation. Allegations without evidence of economic impact are unlikely to change an outcome.

The codified framework, add-backs & wastage

Shinohara & Shinohara [2025] FedCFamC1A 126; (2025) FLC 94-266 (23 July 2025)

The leading authority on the amended s 79 — the end of balance-sheet add-backs.

The first appellate decision interpreting the amended s 79. The Full Court held that property which no longer exists cannot be ‘property’ for the purposes of s 79(3)(a), so notional add-backs can no longer sit on the balance sheet. Spent or dissipated funds are instead considered through historical contributions (s 79(4)) or current and future circumstances (s 79(5)) — including wastage under s 79(5)(d).

For mediators: the familiar mediation balance sheet with an ‘add-backs’ section no longer reflects the law for post-amendment matters. Dissipated funds are a conversation about contributions and adjustments, not notional assets.

FULL JUDGMENT — AUSTLII

Koroma & Ishak [2026] FedCFamC1A 18 (4 March 2026)

The transition case — Shinohara does not apply to pre-amendment matters.

A $22.6M pool with $3.8M in add-backs. The Full Court confirmed Shinohara’s reasoning applies only to matters determined under the amended Act; the orthodox add-back approach under the previous law was not in error.

On debts: a claimed $1M ATO liability was excluded because there was no evidence of how the debt arose or where the income went.

For mediators: two frameworks are currently in operation depending on when a matter is determined — and a claimed liability needs evidence behind it. A useful discipline to bring into the disclosure stage.

FULL JUDGMENT — AUSTLII

Anselmo & Anselmo [2026] FedCFamC1A 87 (20 May 2026)

The most detailed appellate application of the new provisions so far.

Existing property is identified under s 79(3)(a) (‘existing’ is not redundant — the inquiry is what exists at hearing); post-separation spending is considered via s 79(5)(d) (wastage), (n) and (v); and a failure to account for significant dissipation is likely to affect whether an order is just and equitable under s 79(2). The Court cautioned against a ‘cookie-cutter approach’ — the discretion remains broad.

For mediators: the case to cite when explaining where each type of ‘spent money’ argument now belongs. If parties are talking in percentages, ask about the range — no lawyer can promise a specific outcome, and there is no formula.

FULL JUDGMENT — AUSTLII

McNaulty & McNaulty [2026] FedCFamC1A 80 (8 May 2026)

Wastage and misappropriation claims need real evidence.

The appellant sought to add back $217,194 allegedly misappropriated. An accountant’s report identified suspect transactions but could not identify who was responsible. Absent further evidence, the claim failed — and the appeal with it.

For mediators: a suspicion of dissipated funds is not enough. Parties raising wastage in mediation need to understand what they would actually have to prove.

FULL JUDGMENT — AUSTLII

Tschida & Tschida [2026] FedCFamC1A 114 (25 June 2026)

Adopting part (but not all) of a party’s proposal is not procedurally unfair.

A marriage of more than 40 years. The husband argued it was unfair for the judge to adopt some of his proposed orders but not others. The Full Court found no error: the defeat of a litigant’s expectation is not of itself procedural unfairness, and no error was established in the treatment of add-backs.

For mediators: outcomes are packages — a court can accept part of a proposal and reject the rest, and no party is entitled to their whole package. Encourage parties to present proposals they can live with as a whole.

FULL JUDGMENT — AUSTLII

Disclosure obligations

The duty of full and frank disclosure now sits in the Act (ss 71B, 90RI). It applies to separated parties preparing for a proceeding about financial or property matters — which squarely includes the FDR and mediation stage — and continues until the matter is finalised. Disclosure covers assets, liabilities, income and financial resources held directly or indirectly, in Australia or overseas (including foreign property, pensions and superannuation).

Zha & Wun (No 2) [2025] FedCFamC1A 101 (13 June 2025)

Non-disclosure will not stop the court making just and equitable orders.

The husband claimed a pool of about $50M. After finding he had failed to make full and frank disclosure, the trial judge found the identified assets were worth at least $565.9M — including about $493.6M attributed to the husband through a company found to be his alter ego. The wife appealed, arguing the adjustment in her favour should have been larger still because of the non-disclosure. The Full Court dismissed her appeal: attributing the company’s value to the husband was an appropriate response to the non-disclosure, and the orders were just and equitable. The case illustrates the range of consequences of hiding assets: adverse inferences, findings made on an incomplete picture, and costs.

For mediators: the clearest recent example for explaining why hiding assets does not work — the court attributed the concealed wealth to the non-discloser and the orders stood. Persistent resistance to disclosing can itself be a red flag for financial abuse worth screening for.

FULL JUDGMENT — AUSTLII

Khadem & Dabiri [2026] FedCFamC1A 48 (24 March 2026)

Persistent non-disclosure: adverse inferences, credit findings and costs.

The primary judge found repeated failures to comply with disclosure and that the husband lacked credit. The Full Court confirmed that inadequate disclosure affects the assessment of evidence, supports adverse inferences, and can bear on the onus of proof. His appeal was dismissed with fixed-sum costs. Failing to call an available witness (his mother, on an alleged loan of over $500,000) also attracted an adverse inference.

For mediators: useful when reality-testing a party resisting disclosure — litigation treats non-disclosure harshly, and undocumented ‘family loans’ fare poorly. Ask for documents or evidence of what a party claims, to share with the other.

FULL JUDGMENT — AUSTLII

Peng & Zhang [2026] FedCFamC1A 83 (13 May 2026)

Disclosure is for the proceedings — using it for a collateral purpose is an abuse of process.

The husband commenced Australian property proceedings predominantly to use interlocutory disclosure to gather evidence for ongoing Chinese litigation. The Full Court upheld summary dismissal as an abuse of process and ordered fixed costs of $80,837.90.

For mediators: financial information exchanged in a dispute resolution process is for resolving that dispute — a good anchor for explaining confidentiality and proper purpose at intake.

FULL JUDGMENT — AUSTLII

Other 2026 decisions worth knowing

Shehu & Vicario [2026] FedCFamC1A 49 (24 March 2026)

On a pool of some $153M, the Full Court said: “We entirely reject such a proposition. It is an incorrect, and now out-dated, notion that contributions to the family carry less weight or value than contributions to property or income.” (The appeal by the husband’s estate nonetheless succeeded on other grounds, and the division was re-exercised from 72.5/27.5 to 80/20 in the estate’s favour.) For mediators: powerful language for parties who undervalue a homemaker’s contribution.

FULL JUDGMENT — AUSTLII

Caldwell & Caldwell [2026] FedCFamC1A 81 (11 May 2026)

By majority, three family trusts were declared property of the husband because he had effective control of them — through his position as co-appointor, with powers he attained on his father’s death — and he did not need to have exercised that control. For mediators: relevant to intake and suitability where family trusts are involved, and to knowing when a matter needs legal and accounting advice alongside mediation.

FULL JUDGMENT — AUSTLII

Mihova & Mihova [2026] FedCFamC1A 79 (7 May 2026)

Litigation funding orders must be founded on evidence of the reasonableness of the sum sought, should not be routinely filed, and any inequality in interim funding can be taken into account later under s 79(5). For mediators: context for parties worried about unequal access to funds while a matter is on foot.

FULL JUDGMENT — AUSTLII

Agar & Lemus [2026] FedCFamC1A 86 (15 May 2026)

Final orders were amended under the slip rule to share the wife’s historic tax liabilities — an order neither party sought. The Full Court allowed the appeal: substantially controversial changes cannot be made under the slip rule. For mediators: unresolved tax positions (e.g. years of unlodged returns) are a recurring landmine — surface them at intake.

FULL JUDGMENT — AUSTLII

Implications for property mediation practice

Intake & screening — screen for economic and financial abuse in every property matter, not only where parenting issues raise family violence. The s 4AB(2A) examples give a practical checklist.

Assessment & suitability — where financial control has been part of the relationship, consider its effect on capacity to negotiate — information asymmetry, fear, financial literacy gaps — and design the process accordingly.

Disclosure — the statutory duty applies at the mediation stage, and s 71B(10)/s 90RI(10) put a positive obligation on the FDR practitioner to explain it, explain the consequences of not complying, and encourage compliance. Build full and frank disclosure into agreements to mediate.

Balance sheets — remove notional add-backs from post-amendment matters. Deal with dissipated funds as contribution and adjustment arguments, and make sure wastage claims are grounded in evidence.

Session structure — the codified pathway (existing property and liabilities → contributions including family-violence effects → current and future circumstances, with the overriding requirement that the outcome be just and equitable) offers a natural agenda that mirrors what a court would do.

Managing expectations — family violence is now expressly in the pathway, but adjustments must be reasoned and evidence-based. Neither dismiss it nor promise a windfall.

Sources & notes

Full judgments are published on AustLII (austlii.edu.au). Legislation: Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) as amended by the Family Law Amendment Act 2024 (Cth); Attorney-General’s Department (ag.gov.au/families); Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (fcfcoa.gov.au).

This handout is educational material for Mi FDR students, Members and professional colleagues. It is not legal advice — practitioners should read the full judgments before relying on any case, and parties should be referred for independent legal advice on their own circumstances.

Citations and case summaries verified against the judgments and the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), Compilation No. 101 (10 June 2025), on 1 September 2026.

Educational material for CPD only — not legal advice. Read the full judgments before relying on any case. mediationinstitute.edu.au

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